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Perry and Slim: Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War
BOOK REVIEWS

A cursory review of Scahill’s online
postings, blogs, and congressional testimony reveals a clear and evident bias.
But hardly any reasonable military professional would argue that the actions
of companies like Blackwater have not
harmed the coalition forces’ counterinsurgency effort in Iraq. Downstream
and third-order effects of these sometimes reckless and frequently arrogant
mercenaries are not part of the calculation—they get paid for keeping the
principal alive and unharmed. On the
other hand, Scahill’s rejection of private
security companies as a concept leaves
little room for the possibility that companies like Blackwater could be useful
in the national security apparatus if future administrations and Congress
could muster the political will to control them under an effective and feasible system of accountability. Moreover,
while there is plenty to condemn about
Blackwater’s legacy, tactics, and management, that is only half of Scahill’s
story. That Blackwater founder Erik
Prince is a deeply and evidently religious conservative is prima facie evidence, according to Scahill, that he and
his business is or should be thoroughly
discredited.
Finally, Scahill laments that Blackwater
has been able to recruit seasoned intelligence and operational professionals,
such as Cofer Black, without acknowledging that it is a common practice for
corporations to recruit talent from the
government, and vice versa. He paints
Black, in particular, as a sellout, when
Black’s hiring by Blackwater only follows the typical pattern of Washington
professionals across many vocations.
Faulting his decision to move to the
private sector is shallow and naive.
The bottom line on Blackwater is that it
is worth reading. The book is a useful
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medium to take stock of the myriad issues that confront policy makers on this
controversial subject. Yet Scahill’s antipathy toward all things Bush, Republican, and the Christian right ultimately
takes over. Coupled with untidy organization and the author’s tendency to repeat himself, this renders his work less
constructive and credible than it otherwise might have been.
R. G. BRACKNELL

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Regimental Judge Advocate,
Regimental Combat Team 5, Al Asad, Iraq

Slim, Hugo. Killing Civilians: Method, Madness,
and Morality in War. New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 2008. 300pp. $29.95

Hugo Slim has written a remarkable and
disturbing book that everyone concerned with the safety of “civilians”
should read—and then join the public
debate about protecting them. Slim
states that while the word “civilian” has
long been an ambiguous concept, it is
one we must do more to support because it is grounded in basic Western
values. He encourages wide public discussion about defending and expanding
the civilian concept in an age of terrorism, failing states, and ethnic strife. He
has fulfilled this purpose admirably, with
a deep and wide breadth of scholarship
that should spark serious debate at all
levels.
This book is remarkable because the author, who has worked in humanitarian
assistance for more than twenty years,
tells of the horrendous evil that men do
with a dispassionate tone that allows
both the deadly logic of civilian killing
and its terrible results to seep into the
reader’s mind. It is disturbing. This
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reader was taken aback to realize that
rather than build revulsion, the accumulation of damning evidence created the
same “not my job” effect that allows nations to ignore atrocities against whole
peoples.
Slim describes in detail the “seven
spheres of civilian suffering”: direct violence (murder, genocide, etc.), rape and
sexual violence, forced movement, impoverishment, famine and disease, emotional suffering, and postwar suffering.
The book’s most disturbing aspect is the
six chapters that describe the painful details about civilian killing. Only one
chapter is dedicated to promoting civilian protection. This offers practical expressions of philosopher Howard
Gardner’s seven “levers” for changing
human minds as Slim’s answer to the dilemma: reason, research, resonance
(emotion and morality), representational redescription (shared identity), resources and rewards, real world events,
and resistance. Oddly, Slim’s suggestions
as to how to apply these levers, such as
international criminal courts, fail to resonate with the same passion as the myriad justifications for civilian killing. But
this may be the point: killing results
from the strongest passions, while the
act of sparing life results from the more
enduring, yet more difficult to evoke,
feelings of mercy, compassion, and love.
ROBERT L. PERRY

Naval War College

Gati, Charles. Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt.
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Historians are charged with applying
twenty-twenty hindsight to incidents
that, at the time, seem to be only a curious combination of blurring events.
Charles Gati, a leading commentator on
Central European history and politics,
does just that in Failed Illusions, his
study of the abortive Hungarian Revolution of 1956 against the Soviet Union.
His book was fifty years in the making,
partly because many of his primary
sources have only recently been made
available. Although he was a firsthand
observer of events in Hungary in the
1950s, Gati delayed this work to ensure
that it reflected an appropriate level of
objectivity. Gati was in Budapest at the
time of the revolution, having recently
been fired from a state-run newspaper
for no ostensible reason. While this
made him sympathetic to the revolution, he readily admits to a certain
naiveté about why it was happening.
This work is largely a result of his personal quest to retrospectively understand this seminal event that shaped his
life. He emigrated to the United States
shortly after the revolution.
Imre Nagy, prime minister of Hungary
and the leader of the revolution, is the
story’s protagonist. Through superb usage of primary and personal sources,
Gati humanizes this ultimately tragic
figure. The book’s most profound insights are in its handling of the decision
makers in Moscow and Washington.
Moscow possessed the ultimate power
and was responsible for the decisions
that led to the Soviet invasion of Hungary in November 1956. However,
Gati’s use of recently opened records
proves conclusively that Soviet leadership was not “trigger happy.” It is eye
opening to see just how close the Soviet
politburo came to allowing Hungary to
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